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ESTATES, TRUSTS, AND WILLS
Glen A. Driveness
Four recent cases concerning estates, trusts, and wills have
reached the Montana Supreme Court: Ziegler v. Kramer,I Burr v.
Department of Revenue,2 Boatman v. Berg,3 and In re Estate of
Sample.' The first three cases offer no significant changes from
earlier decisions. Accordingly, analysis of them will be limited to the
facts presented and to how each fits within existing law. In Sample,
the court interpreted the Uniform Probate Code in a way that limits
the usefulness of a self-proving affidavit attached to a will. A discus-
sion of Sample suggests a course the court could have taken.
I. Ziegler v. Kramer
Following the publication of the first notice to creditors of the
decedent's estate, the plaintiffs presented a claim for services ren-
dered to the decedent. Although the plaintiffs admitted that they
had given their assistance without any expectation of payment, they
produced a writing signed by the decedent which they claimed gave
them certain money deposited in a Billings bank. The personal
representative rejected the claim and plaintiffs filed suit in district
court on the theory that the writing evidenced an implied contract
between the plaintiffs and the decedent. After the personal repre-
sentative moved for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed a mo-
tion to amend and add a supplemental complaint based on the
theory that the decedent had made a gift to them of the bank ac-
count. By the time of the supplemental pleading, more than ten
months had passed since publication of the first notice to creditors
of the estate. The plaintiffs' motion was denied and motion for
summary judgment was granted.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's action. The court noted that filing a creditor's claim with an
estate within four months of the first publication of notice to credi-
tors is a prerequisite to an action on that claim in district court.'
This four-month statute of limitation is codified at Montana Code
Annotated [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 72-3-803 (1)(a) (1978).1
The plaintiffs attempted to add an alternative theory of recovery at
1. - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 644 (1978).
2. - Mont. - , 575 P.2d 45 (1978).
3. - Mont. - , 577 P.2d 382 (1978).
4. - Mont. - , 572 P.2d 1232 (1977).
5. - Mont. at - , 573 P.2d at 645.
6. Formerly codified at REVisED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M.
1947], § 91A-3-803(1)(a).
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the district court level on the premise that the writing represented
an attempt by the decedent to make a gift to them. The implied
contract action pleaded in the original complaint failed as a matter
of law because the plaintiffs' services admittedly were rendered
without expectation of payment.' Because the gift theory of recovery
was not within the scope of the implied contract theory, it was
barred. The district court concluded that the claim had not been
presented to the personal representative within the statutory period
of four months and the supreme court agreed.
Ziegler exemplifies the compatibility of the Uniform Probate
Code with pre-Code law in Montana regarding presentation of
claims to the administrator of an estate. In Brown v. Daly,s a 1906
case, it was held that an amended complaint cannot set up a new
cause of action unless the claim upon which the action is based has
first been presented to the executor. The plaintiff in Brown pre-
sented a claim to the executrix of the Daly estate. The claim was
based on a contract for deed in which the plaintiff and his wife were
joint owners of the property being sold. After the plaintiffs claim
was rejected, he commenced an action in district court to recover
his share of the amount due on the contract. An amended complaint
was subsequently filed joining the plaintiff's wife as a party and
demanding the full amount due on the contract. Judgment was
rendered in the defendant's favor because the amended cause of
action was barred by the four-month statute of limitation because
it was different from the claim presented to the executrix. The judg-
ment was affirmed on appeal. The Montana Supreme Court found
that the plaintiff had treated the claim as a several contract when
presented to the executrix, although it was in fact a joint contract
because both plaintiff and his wife owned the property. The court
concluded that, by amending the claim to a joint contract action in
district court, the plaintiff had tried to circumvent the statutory
system which permits an action to be brought in court only after the
identical claim had been presented and rejected by the administra-
tor of the estate.
One purpose of the Uniform Probate Code is to expedite the
settlement and distribution of estates with minimal involvement by
the courts.? To recover on a claim against an estate, a creditor must
act within four months of the time the personal representative first
publishes notice to creditors.'0 The claim must be presented to the
7. - Mont. at -. , 573 P.2d at 645.
8. 33 Mont. 523, 84 P. 883 (1906).
9. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, art. 3, pt. 8, Editorial Board Comment.
10. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 72-3-803 (1)(a) (1978)
(formerly codified at'R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-3-803 (1)(a)).
1979]
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personal representative, who determines whether the claim will be
paid. A creditor may then appeal the rejection of a claim by filing
an action in district court, but, as shown by Ziegler, the grounds for
recovery must be precisely the same as those presented to the per-
sonal representative within the allotted time.
II. Burr v. Department of Revenue
Joyce and Robert Eggert owned certain property in joint ten-
ancy. Joyce died on August 14, 1972, and Robert died on August 15,
1972. Inheritance taxes were paid on the joint property by both
Joyce's and Robert's estates on August 21, 1973. The plaintiff, the
sole surviving heir, filed for a refund of the amount paid by Joyce's
estate pursuant to what is now MCA § 72-16-318 (1978)." This
statute had been amended subsequent to the deaths of the Eggerts
but prior to the payment of inheritance taxes on their estates. 2 The
1973 amendment allows a credit against inheritance taxes in certain
instances when the wife predeceases the husband. Prior to the
amendment the credit was available only when the husband died
first.
The district court determined that the statute as amended was
applicable and granted the refund. In reversing this ruling, the
Montana Supreme Court held that in the absence of specific lan-
guage from the legislature requiring application of the 1973 amend-
ment retroactively, the amount of inheritance tax was determinable
according to the language of the statute in effect at the time of
death. Quoting from an earlier Montana opinion, 3 the court reem-
phasized the important rule that a state's right to an inheritance tax
vests immediately upon death. The court further said:
An inheritance tax accrues at the same time the estate vests,
that is, upon the death of the decedent. All questions concerning
the tax must be determined as of the date of decedent's death. The
right of the state to an inheritance tax vests immediately upon the
decedent's death, although at that time the state may not know
the amount of the tax."
The Burr case comports with existing law and in addition to the rule
11. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4414(5) (Supp. 1977).
12. MCA § 72-16-318 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947 § 91-4415(5) (Supp.
1977)) provides:
Any child of a decedent is entitled to credit for so much of the tax paid by the
decedent's spouse as applied to any property which is thereafter transferred by or
from such spouse to the child, provided the spouse does not survive the decedent
to exceed 10 years.
13. In re Clark's Estate, 105 Mont. 401, 424, 74 P.2d 401, 412 (1937).
14. - Mont. at - , 575 P.2d at 47.
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on vesting of the state's right to receive taxes, the case will undoubt-
edly be cited as additional precedent for the rule that amendments
will not be effective retroactively unless the legislature specifically
so directs.
II. Boatman v. Berg
The plaintiff's husband died in 1959, leaving an estate consist-
ing mostly of real property. The property was heavily encumbered.
The plaintiff asked the defendant, her older brother, to help with
the administration of the estate. During a five-year period the plain-
tiff assigned her interest in four separate tracts of land to the defen-
dant, who paid off the full amount owing each time.
The plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaration that the
defendant held the land conveyed to him in constructive trust for
her benefit. The district court denied the relief requested and qui-
eted title to the land in the defendant, finding that there had been
no clear and convincing proof of any wrongful act by the defen-
dant. 15 The court also found that each transfer of property was sup-
ported by adequate consideration in the form of cancellation of
indebtedness.
The theory of the plaintiff's case was based on the combined
effect of four relevant statutes." She contended that the defendant
had voluntarily assumed a relationship of personal trust and confid-
ence, thereby making him a trustee." As such, he was by law
"bound to act in the highest good faith"'' toward the plaintiff, and
all transactions between the parties that benefited defendant must
be presumed to have been entered into without sufficient considera-
15. Proof of wrongful act is required under MCA § 72-20-111 (1978) (formerly codified
at R.C.M. 1947, § 86-210), which provides:
One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation
of trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some other or better right thereto,
an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would
otherwise have had it. (Emphasis added.)
16. MCA §§ 72-20-105, 111, 201, and 208 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§
86-205, 210, 301, and 308).
17. MCA § 72-20-105 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 86-205) provides:
Every person who voluntarily assumes a relation of personal confidence with an-
other is deemed a trustee, within the meaning of this chapter, not only as to the
person who reposes such confidence, but also as to all persons of whose affairs he
thus acquires information which was given to such person in the like confidence,
or over whose affairs he, by such confidence, obtains any control.
18. MCA § 72-20-201 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 86-301) provides:
In all matters connected with his trust, a trustee is bound to act in the highest good
faith toward his beneficiary, and may not obtain any advantage therein over the
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tion and under undue influence."' Because of this presumption, the
plaintiff urged the imposition of a constructive trust for her benefit
on all property she had conveyed to defendant.
The Montana Supreme Court disposed of the plaintiff s conten-
tions by applying the precedent of Roecher v. Story,2" in which the
court said that if the same evidence being used to show a fiduciary
relationship also shows that the trustee has acted in good faith and
for the benefit of the cestui, the presumption of wrongdoing is not
available. In Roecher, the plaintiff, as administrator of the dece-
dent's estate, brought an action against the decedent's son for an
accounting of certain property acquired by him while acting as trus-
tee of his ther's business. The plaintiff "alleged that because the
son ingratiated himself with the father by operating the father's
business, a fiduciary relationship was formed from which the pre-
sumption arose that the son's acquisition of the father's property
was the result of undue influence.
In Boatman and Roecher, the plaintiff attempted to avoid the
burden of proving the defendant's wrongdoing merely by showing
that a confidential relationship existed between the defendant and
the trustor with the result that any transaction between them which
benefits the defendant should be presumed to have been entered
into without consideration and under undue influence. By statute,2'
such proof shifts the burden of showing good faith and the absence
of wrongdoing to the defendant. In this kind of case, the plaintiff,
while establishing the existence of a confidential relationship, must
by the same evidence show bad faith and wrongdoing on defendant's
part before the burden is shifted. The net effect is that the expressed
requirement of a wrongful act as a prerequisite to the imposition of
a constructive trust under MCA § 72-20-111 (1978)2 is an implied
requirement to the presumption of undue influence under MCA §
72-20-208 (1978).2 Stated another way, the presumption of undue
influence does not arise simply from a showing of a confidential
relationship. An involuntary trust must first be established, which
requires the showing of a wrongful act which benefited the person
in the position of a trustee. If the same evidence which is introduced
to show a confidential relationship also shows that the actions taken
19. MCA § 72-20-208 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 86-308) provides:
All transactions between a trustee and his beneficiary during the existence of the
trust, or while the influence acquired by the trustee remains, by which he obtains
any advantage from his beneficiary, are presumed to be entered into by the latter
without sufficient consideration, and under undue influence.
20. 91 Mont. 28, 5 P.2d 205 (1931).
21. MCA § 72-20-208 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 86-308).
22. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 86-210.
23. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 86-308.
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benefited the person in the position of alleged trustor, then an invol-
untary trust will not be established and the presumption against
trustees cannot be raised.
In its opinion, the court equates the term "fiduciary relation"
with the term "confidential relation." Both terms were defined in
Kerrigan v. O'Meara2' as a relation founded "upon trust or confid-
ence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another,
and precludes the idea of profit or advantage resulting from the
dealings of the parties and the person in whom the confidence is
reposed." The importance of such a relationship is its part in es-
tablishing a constructive trust. The constructive trust is a device
used by courts to compel one who unfairly holds a property interest
to convey that interest to another to whom it justly belongs. 2 Abuse
of a confidential relationship is one ground for application of a con-
structive trust. To establish a confidential relationship a court must
find the actual placing of trust and confidence on at least one occa-
sion and a disparity of position of the parties. The person benefiting
from the relationship must be in a weakened position or related in
such a degree that great trust is naturally reposed in the other
person.2
While the parties in Boatman were brother and sister, the issue
of the existence of a confidential relationship was not addressed
directly. The court found that in the transactions between the plain-
tiff and the defendant there was adequate consideration given in
each and no proof of wrongdoing on the defendant's part. Without
the element of unfairness, the existence of a confidential relation-
ship is not enough to support a constructive trust.
IV. In re Estate of Sample
The petitioner instituted a proceeding for probate of a will and
appointment of herself as personal representative of her father's
estate. The petition was opposed by Calvin Sample, the incapaci-
tated son of the decedent who was disinherited under the will.
Grounds for the challenge were that the will failed to meet the
formalities of execution as required by law. To be valid a will must
be
in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some
other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and
shall be signed by at least two persons each of whom witnessed
24. 71 Mont. 1, 227 P. 819 (1924).
25. Id. at 6, 227 P. at 821.
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either the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signa-
ture or of the will.'
The Sample will was signed by the testator on the second page, after
the dispositive provisions, and was dated April 28, 1976. No other
signatures appeared on this page. The third page of the will consis-
ted of a self-proving affidavit following the form provided in the
Uniform Probate Code.2 9 The purpose of this type of affidavit is to
allow a will to be probated without the testimony of any subscribing
witnesses. 3 In the Sample will the self-proving clause was appar-
ently signed by the witnesses in the mistaken belief that they were
signing an attestation clause, although this is not made clear from
the case. The form was also signed by the testator and dated April
28, 1976. Probate of the will was denied for lack of attesting wit-
nesses' signatures in the form required by MCA § 72-2-302 (1978). 31
The appellant argued before the Montana Supreme Court that
the addition of the self-proved affidavit cured the defect in the will's
execution, citing Estate of Cutsinger32 as authority. In Cutsinger,
the signatures of the witnesses to the will appeared after a self-
proving clause on the same page as the will's last article. The propo-
nent did not attempt to establish the will as self-proved. Instead,
the two witnesses testified in court that the testatrix signed the will
in their presence and that they signed as subscribing witnesses at
testatrix's request in her presence and in the presence of each other.
The will was upheld as meeting the formalities of execution. There
is no indication from the facts of Sample whether the witnesses to
the will gave any testimony. The Cutsinger court noted that such
testimony would make a substantial difference.
The court in Sample concluded that a self-proving document
attached to a will signed only by the testator does not overcome the
lack of compliance with the formalities of execution. The court re-
lied on a Texas case, Boren v. Boren,3' for its decision. In that case,
a one-page will signed by the testator alone was denied probate even
though an affidavit signed by two witnesses was attached. Citing
the Texas Probate Code,3 the court in Boren found that the only
28. MCA § 72-2-302 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-502).
29. MCA § 72-2-304 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-504).
30. MCA § 72-2-304 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-504), Editorial
Board Comment.
31. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-502.
32. 445 P.2d 778 (Okla. 1968).
33. Id. at 781, 782.
34. 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966).
35. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. tit. 17A, § 59 (Vernon), provides in pertinent part that "[a]
self-proved will may be admitted to probate without the testimony of any subscribing wit-
nesses, but otherwise it shall be treated no differently than a will not self-proved."
[Vol. 40
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purpose of a self-proving provision is to admit a validly executed
will to probate without testimony from subscribing witnesses. The
valid execution of the will was a condition precedent to the useful-
ness of a self-proving clause. The Montana court adopted this rea-
soning as the rule in Sample.
Should probate of a will be denied automatically when it has a
formal defect? One writer 7 has suggested that inquiry should first
be made by the court into whether the noncomplying document
expresses the decedent's testamentary intent. If it does, and the will
sufficiently approximates the formal statutory requirements so as to
enable the court to determine that the purposes of the applicable
laws are served, the will should be upheld.3
The purpose of statutorily imposed formalities of execution is
to prevent probate of a will that is a tentative, doubtful, or coerced
expression of succession. 9 In the absence of proof going to the issue
of testamentary intent, the method of attestation, by itself, should
not preclude a will's admissibility, so long as there is a sufficient
attempt to attest. The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code in-
tended "to validate wills which meet the minimum formalities" 0 of
execution while providing an alternative means of attestation in the
self-proved will."1
Considering the minimal requirements necessary to comply
with the formalities of execution, a finding of lack of compliance by
the testator is difficult to understand, particularly where a self-
proving affidavit has been attached. One explanation is that the
parties signed what they thought was the attestation clause. Where
this happens some courts have held that the will may still be valid:
If the witness has the animus attestandi or intention to attest when
he signs a will it should not matter whether he signs below an
attestation clause or in a self-proving clause. This can only be
determined by testimony of the witness when the will is offered for
probate. Unless there is evidence of fraud or undue influence, this
should be sufficient. The same effect is given where the witness
signs the name of another as his signature. If he signs with the
requisite intent the document is given legal effect.'
36. - Mont. at __ , 572 P.2d at 1234.
37. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HIv. L. Rzy. 489 (1975).
38. Id. at 513.
39. T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WnI S § 62 (2d ed. 1953).
40. MCA § 72-2-302 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-502), Editorial
Board Comment.
41. The Editorial Board Comment preceding ch. 2, pt. 5 of the Montana Uniform
Probate Code states that the wills section of the Code "provides for a more formal method of
execution with acknowledgment before a public officer (the self-proved will)."
42. 2 BOWE & PARKER, PAGE ON WHLS §§ 19.133, 19.134 (3d ed. 1960).
19791
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While requiring testimony of the subscribing witnesses is contrary
to the main purpose of a self-proved will, by such testimony the
court is provided with an alternative to the rejection of what may
otherwise be a perfectly clear and unobjectionable indication of the
testator's intent.
To avoid a result similar to that in Sample, the drafter of a will
in Montana must be certain to comply with the requirements of
execution as provided in MCA § 72-2-302 (1978).13 A properly exe-
cuted will must contain an attestation clause signed by two wit-
nesses. Care should be taken when the optional self-proving affida-
vit is included with the will: each witness must sign twice, once in
the attestation clause and again in the self-proving affidavit. W hile
use of the self-proving affidavit is optional, it should be included in
every will because it eliminates the necessity of testimony by the
witnesses to the will if the will is contested. If both the attestation
clause and the self-proving affidavit are properly signed, the prob-
lem presented in Sample can be easily avoided.
43. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-502.
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